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Abstract. We discuss our experiences in building tools for software verification 
of autonomic systems developed with the Autonomic System Specification 
Language (ASSL). ASSL is a software framework that aims to assist developers 
of autonomic systems by providing a powerful combination of both notation 
and tools. One of the major objectives of the framework is to assure the correct-
ness of the autonomic systems via inclusion of tools targeting consistency 
checking, model checking, and automatic test case generation. In this paper, we 
review our recent work on these tools.  
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1   Introduction 
The Autonomic System Specification Language (ASSL) [1, 2] is a formal method 
dedicated to the development of autonomic systems (ASs) [3]. Conceptually, ASSL 
assists developers with formal specification, validation, and code generation of such 
systems. Due to the synthesis approach of automatic code generation, ASSL guaran-
tees consistency between a specification and the corresponding implementation.  
As part of the framework validation, ASSL has been successfully used to specify 
autonomic features and generate AS models for a variety of computer systems includ-
ing prototypes of two NASA projects—the Autonomous Nano-Technology Swarm 
(ANTS) concept mission [4] and the Voyager mission [5]. Our experience with ASSL 
has demonstrated that although the framework is very efficient, errors can be easily 
introduced while specifying large systems. The first release of ASSL provides built-in 
consistency checking and functional testing as the only means of software verifica-
tion. This helps developers easily discover syntax and consistency errors, but barely 
handles logical errors. To increase the framework’s software-verification capabilities, 
we have been investigating model checking [6] as the most effective approach to 
software verification for our purposes.  In addition, in order to detect errors intro-
duced not only in ASSL specifications, but also with supplementary coding, the  
automatic verification support provided by the ASSL tools is to be augmented by 
appropriate automatic generation of test cases. Both model checking and automatic 
test case generation are subjects of new research projects at Lero–the Irish Software 
Engineering Research Center. In this paper, we briefly present existing and new soft-
ware-verification approaches for ASSL.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly present the 
ASSL formal specification model. In Section 3, we present the basic consistency 
checking mechanism.  Sections 4 and 5 present our approach to model checking and 
automatic test case generation with ASSL. Finally, Section 6 provides brief conclud-
ing remarks and a summary of future research goals. 
2   ASSL 
ASSL [1, 2] is based on a specification model exposed over hierarchically organized 
formalization tiers (see Table 1). This specification model provides both infrastructure 
elements and mechanisms needed by an AS (autonomic system). Each tier of the 
ASSL specification model is intended to describe different aspects of the AS in ques-
tion, such as service-level objectives, policies, interaction protocols, events, actions, 
autonomic elements, etc. This helps to specify an AS at different levels of abstraction 
(imposed by the ASSL tiers) where the AS in question is composed of special auto-
nomic elements (AEs) interacting over interaction protocols (IPs).  
Table 1. ASSL multi-tier specification model 
AS 
AS Service-level Objectives 
AS Self-management Policies 
AS Architecture 
AS Actions 
AS Events 
AS Metrics 
ASIP 
AS Messages 
AS Channels 
AS Functions 
AE 
AE Service-level Objectives 
AE Self-management Policies 
AE Friends 
AEIP 
AE Messages 
AE Channels 
AE Functions 
AE Managed Elements 
AE Recovery Protocols 
AE Behavior Models 
AE Outcomes 
AE Actions 
AE Events 
AE Metrics 
 
As shown in Table 1, the ASSL specification model decomposes an AS in two  
directions: 1) into levels of functional abstraction; and 2) into functionally related 
sub-tiers. The first decomposition presents the system at three different tiers [1, 2]:  
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1) a general and global AS perspective – we define the general system rules 
(providing autonomic behavior), architecture, and global actions, events, and metrics 
applied in these rules; 
2) an interaction protocol (IP) perspective – we define the means of communi-
cation between AEs within an AS; 
3) a unit-level perspective – we define interacting sets of individual computing 
elements (AEs) with their own autonomic behavior rules, actions, events, metrics, etc.  
The second decomposition presents the major tiers AS, ASIP and as composed of 
functionally related sub-tiers, where new AS properties emerge at each sub-tier. The 
AS Tier specifies an AS in terms of service-level objectives (AS SLOs), self-
management policies, architecture topology, actions, events, and metrics (see Table 
1). The AS SLOs are a high-level form of behavioral specification that helps develop-
ers establish system objectives such as performance. The self-management policies 
are driven by events and trigger the execution of actions driving an AS in critical 
situations. The metrics constitute a set of parameters and observables controllable by 
an AS. With the ASIP Tier, the ASSL framework helps developers specify an  
AS-level interaction protocol as a public communication interface expressed with 
special communication channels, communication functions, and communication mes-
sages. At the AE Tier, the ASSL formal model exposes specification constructs for 
the specification of the system’s AEs. Note that AEs are considered to be analogous 
to software agents able to manage their own behavior and their relationships with 
other AEs. An AE may also specify a private AE interaction protocol (AEIP) shared 
with special AE considered as “friends” (AE Friends tier).   
It is important to mention that the ASSL tiers are intended to specify different as-
pects of the AS in question, but it is not necessary to employ all of them in order to 
develop an AS. Conceptually, it is sufficient to specify self-management policies 
only, because those provide self-management behavior at the level of AS (the AS tier) 
and at the level of AE (AE tier). These policies are specified within the AS/AE Self-
management Policies sub-tier (the ASSL construct is AS[AE]SELF_MANAGEMENT) with 
special ASSL constructs termed fluents and mappings [1, 2]. A fluent is a state where 
an AS enters with fluent-activating events and exits with fluent-terminating events. A 
mapping connects fluents with particular actions to be undertaken. Usually, an ASSL 
specification is built around one or more self-management policies, which make that 
specification AS-driven. Self-management policies are driven by events and actions 
determined deterministically. The following ASSL code presents a sample specifica-
tion of a self-healing policy. 
 
ASSELF_MANAGEMENT {  
 SELF_HEALING {  
  FLUENT inLosingSpacecraft {  
   INITIATED_BY { EVENTS.spaceCraftLost } 
   TERMINATED_BY { EVENTS.earthNotified } }  
  MAPPING { 
   CONDITIONS { inLosingSpacecraft  } 
   DO_ACTIONS { ACTIONS.notifyEarth } } 
 } 
} // ASSELF_MANAGEMENT 
 
4 E. Vassev and M. Hinchey 
As shown, fluents are expressed with fluent-activating and fluent-terminating 
events. In order to express mappings, conditions and actions are considered, where the 
former determine the latter in a deterministic manner.  
Once a specification is complete, it can be validated with the ASSL built-in  
verification mechanisms (e.g., consistency checking) and a functional application 
skeleton can be generated automatically. The application skeletons generated with the 
ASSL framework are fully-operational multithreaded event-driven applications with 
embedded messaging. 
3   Consistency Checking with ASSL 
In general, we can group the ASSL tiers into groups of declarative (or imperative) 
and operational tiers [1, 2]. Whereas the former simply describe definitions in the AS 
under consideration, the latter not only describe definitions but also focus on the op-
erational behavior of that AS.  The ASSL framework evaluates an AS specification 
formally to construct a special declarative specification tree needed to perform both 
consistency checking and code generation. The declarative specification tree is 
created by the framework when parsing an AS specification and contains the hierar-
chical tier structure of that specification. Each specified tier/sub-tier is presented as a 
tier instance. Consistency checking (see Fig. 1) is a framework mechanism for verify-
ing specifications by performing exhaustive traversing of the declarative specification 
tree.  In general, the framework performs two kinds of consistency-checking: 1) light 
– checks for type consistency, ambiguous definitions, etc.; and 2) heavy – checks 
whether the specification model conforms to special correctness properties. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Consistency Checking with ASSL 
The correctness properties are ASSL semantic definitions [1, 2] defined per tier.  
Although, they are expressed in First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FOLTL)1 [6], 
currently ASSL does not incorporate a FOLTL engine, and thus, the consistency 
checking mechanism implements the correctness properties as Java statements. Here, 
the FOLTL operators ׊(forall) and ׌(exists) work over sets of ASSL tier instances. It 
is important to mention that the consistency checking mechanism generates consis-
tency errors and consistency warnings. Warnings are specific situations where the 
                                                          
1
 In general, FOLTL can be seen as a quantified version of linear temporal logic. FOLTL is 
obtained by taking propositional linear temporal logic and adding a first order language to it. 
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specification does not contradict the correctness properties, but rather introduces un-
certainty as to how the code generator will handle it. 
As mentioned above, a variety of predefined correctness properties are subject of 
consistency checking. One of those correctness properties is the so-called autonomici-
ty rule [1, 2]. According to that rule, every autonomic system specified with ASSL 
must have specified at least one self-management policy. Fig. 2 shows an error re-
ported by the ASSL’s consistency checker, because the processed ASSL specification 
violates the autonomicity rule (the entire ASSELF_MANAGEMENT sub-tier comprising the 
self-management policies is commented). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Checking for “Autonomicity” with the Consistency Checker 
4   Built-in Model-Checking Mechanism for ASSL  
In general, model checking advocates formal verification whereby software programs 
are automatically checked for specific flaws by considering correctness properties 
expressed in temporal logic [6].  In this endeavor, three model-checking mechanisms 
for ASSL have been considered: 1) a built-in model checker [7]; 2) a mechanism for 
mapping ASSL specifications to formal notation with provided tool support for model 
checking [8]; and 3) a post-implementation model checker based on the Java Path-
Finder [9] tool developed at NASA Ames. Whereas the first two model-checking 
methods check ASSL specifications, the third one is to verify the generated Java code. 
Note that despite careful specification and the existence of ASSL-level model check-
ing, it is theoretically possible to generate ASs that contain fatal errors (e.g., dead-
locks). This is mainly due to the state-explosion problem, which we discuss in Section 
4.2. Moreover, with the post-implementation model checker we may verify not only 
the newly-generated code but also all consecutively updated versions of the same. 
Thus, the ASSL model-checking mechanisms are intended to verify both the ASSL 
specifications and the corresponding AS implementations. 
In this paper, we report our experience in developing the built-in model checker 
[7]. In this approach, an ASSL specification is translated into a state-transition graph, 
over which model checking is performed to verify whether an ASSL specification 
satisfies correctness properties. Here, the model-checking problem is: given the AS A 
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and its ASSL specification a, determine in the AS’s state graph g (called ASG) 
whether the behavior of A, expressed with the correctness properties p, meets the 
specification a. An ASG formally stems from the concept of Kripke Structure [6]. 
The latter is basically a graph having the reachable states of an ASSL-specified sys-
tem as nodes and the state transitions of the system as edges. In addition, to allow for 
formal verification, each system state must be labeled with properties (called atomic 
propositions AP) that hold in that state and each state transition must be associated 
with one or more state transition operations Op. The notion of state in ASSL is re-
lated to the ASSL specification constructs called ASSL tier instances [1, 2] (specified 
tiers and sub-tiers). The ASSL operational semantics [1, 2] considers a state-transition 
model where tier instances can be in different tier states, e.g., instances of the SLO 
(Service-Level Objectives) tier can be evaluated as satisfied or not satisfied. Here, an 
ASSL-developed AS transits from one state to another when a particular tier instance 
evolves from a tier state to another tier state. Here, transition operations Op cause tier 
instances to evolve. 
4.1   Building the Autonomic System Graph 
In order to build the ASSL model checker, we had to do some preliminary theoretical 
work to prepare the program structures holding an ASG. Here, we had to define: 
1) the reference state model for ASSL-specified ASs, which appeared to be a 
product machine that consists of high-level tier states composed of multilevel nested 
tier states, and the global system state is a product of all nested states (we had to iden-
tify an initial state and all the possible tier states S);  
2) a set of all atomic propositions AP, which denote the properties of individual 
states S, and present the S-AP relationship as tuples of the form (Sn, AP1, …. APn ); 
3) all possible transition relations R as tuples of the form (S1, Op, S2).  
Next, we had to implement structures holding the S-AP and R tuples. Note that those 
are recorded in two flat files (one per tuple type) and are loaded into the implemented 
program structures at the time of ASSL loading. This helps the model-checker tool 
cope with future extensions to ASSL. To implement the tuple structures, we used a 
distinct token class per tuple type (S-AP and R) and used vectors of tuple tokens. In 
addition, a generic algorithm is implemented to traverse those vectors and return a 
sub-vector of tuple tokens refined by state, by operation, or by atomic proposition. 
Thus, at runtime, the model-checking tool can obtain all the atomic propositions and 
related transition operations for a particular state. Here,  
• tier states S are recorded with tier instance name and state name;  
Example: tier { SLO } name { performance } state { unsatisfied } 
• transition operations Op are recorded with their ASSL predefined names [1];  
• atomic propositions AP are recorded with “if” and “then” sections and op-
tional “temporal” operators (a temporal logic operator).  
Example: if { event prompted } then { tempOperator { eventually } fluent initiated }. 
In the next step, we had to develop a mechanism constructing the ASG from an ASSL 
specification. Here, the ASG is constructed by the ASSL framework by using a  
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special declarative specification tree created by the framework when parsing an AS 
specification [1, 2]. The declarative specification tree contains the hierarchical tier 
structure of the actual specification. Thus, enriched with the tier states S, it can be 
used to derive the composite multilevel structure of the ASG by taking into considera-
tion that all the tier instances run concurrently as state machines. Thus, the tier states 
S are derived from the declarative specification tree and enriched with the appropriate 
atomic propositions AP. The latter are retrieved per state.  
In addition, the so-called operational evaluation [1, 2] performed on the ASSL 
specification is used to derive all the transition relations R (S1, Op, S2) needed to 
connect the states S and thus, to construct the ASG. Here, an ASG is composed of 
nodes that can be presented formally as a tuple (s, R, AP) where: s is the tier state;  
R is a set of transition relations connecting the state s to other states via system  
operations; AP is a set of atomic propositions held in s. Similar to the declarative 
specification tree, the generated ASG is hierarchical, i.e., composed of multilevel 
composite tier states. Note that the generated ASG is stored in a flat file, which helps 
us trace the graph. Fig. 3 depicts the transformation of the declarative specification 
tree into an ASG, where the latter is presented at the highest possible level of abstrac-
tion comprising a single composite state “AS Active”, which is a product machine 
consisting of product states. 
 
Fig. 3. Transformation of the Declarative Specification Tree into an ASG 
4.2   Building the Model-Checking Engine 
Next, we had to implement the model checking engine that should work over the 
following algorithm: given that Ф is a correctness property expressed in a temporal 
logic formula, determine whether the “AS Active” tier state (see Fig. 3) satisfies Ф, 
which implies that all possible compositions of nested tier states satisfy Ф.  
Thus, the model-checking engine traverses all the possible paths in an ASG to 
check whether special correctness properties Ф (expressed in a temporal logic) are 
satisfied. In case such a property is not satisfied, the ASSL framework produces a 
counterexample. The latter is an execution path of the ASG for which the desired 
correctness property is not true.  
At the time of writing, the model-checking engine is still under development. We 
are currently examining two possible solutions: 1) developing our own engine; or 2) 
integrating an already existing engine that can process the generated ASG file. En-
gines of current interest are SPIN [10] and GEAR [11]. In all approaches though, we 
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need to consider the so-called state-explosion problem. In general, the size of an ASG 
is at least exponential in the number of ASSL tier instances running concurrently in 
the system (recall that an ASG is a product machine). We are currently working on 
two possible solutions to that problem—abstraction and prioritized tiers. The first 
solution is to use composite tier states to abstract their nested tier states. Thus, given 
an original state graph G (derived from an ASSL specification) an abstraction is ob-
tained by suppressing low-level tier states yielding a simpler and likely smaller state 
graph Ga. This reduces the total amount of states to be considered but is likely to 
introduce a sort of conservative view of the system where the abstraction ensures only 
that correctness of Ga implies correctness of G. The other possible solution is to pri-
oritize ASSL tiers by giving their tier states a special probability weight pw. This can 
be used as a state-reduction factor to derive probability graphs Gpw with a specific 
level of probability weight, e.g., pw > 0,5. However, this approach is likely to intro-
duce probability to the model-checking results, which correlates with the probability 
level of the graph Gpw. 
4.3   Checking Liveness Properties 
This section demonstrates how the ASSL built-in model-checking mechanism can 
perform formal verification to check liveness properties of an AS specified and  
generated with ASSL. Our example is the ASSL specification model for the NASA 
Voyager Mission [5]. In this case study, we specified the Voyager II spacecraft and 
the antennas on Earth as AEs (autonomic elements) that follow their encoded auto-
nomic behavior to process space pictures, and communicate those via predefined 
ASSL messages. In this section, we use a sample from this specification to demon-
strate how a liveness property such as ”a picture taken by the Voyager spacecraft will 
eventually result in sending a message to antennas on Earth” can be checked with the 
ASSL model-checking mechanism. Note that the ASSL specification model for the 
NASA Voyager Mission is relatively large (over 1000 lines of specification code). 
Thus, we do not present the entire specification but a specification sample. For more 
details on that specification, please refer to [5].  
 
 
Fig. 4. The IMAGE_PROCESSING policy 
Fig. 4 presents a partial ASSL specification of the IMAGE_PROCESSING self-
management policy of the Voyager AE. Here the pictureTaken event will be prompted 
when a picture has been taken. This event initiates the inProcessingPicturePixels fluent. The 
same fluent is mapped to a processPicture action, which will be executed once the fluent 
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gets initiated. As it is specified, the processPicture action prompts the execution of the 
sendBeginSessionMsgs communication function (see Fig. 4), which puts a special message 
x on a special communication channel [5] (message x is sent over that channel). Note 
that the specification of both the pictureTaken event and the sendBeginSessionMsgs function  
is not presented here. As we have already mentioned in Section 4.1, the ASSL model-
checking mechanism builds the ASG (autonomic system graph) from the ASSL  
specification. Here both the declarative specification tree and the ASSL operational 
semantics [1, 2] are used to derive tier states S  and transition relations R, and to 
associate those tier states via the ASSL transition operations Op. Next the labeling 
function L(s) (integrated in the model-checking mechanism) labels each tier state s 
with appropriate atomic propositions AP. 
Fig. 5 presents a partial ASSL ASG of the sub-tiers of the Voyager AE. These sub-
tiers are derived from the declarative specification tree constructed for the Voyager 
AE. Note that this ASG is a result of our analytical approach and for reasons of clarity 
it is simplified, i.e., not all the possible tier states are presented here. 
 
 
Fig. 5. State machines of the Voyager AE sub-tiers 
As shown, each sub-tier instance forms a distinct state machine (basic machine) 
within the AE state machine and the AE state machine is a Cartesian product of the 
state machines of its sub-tiers. It is important to mention that by taking the Cartesian 
product of a set of basic sub-tier machines, we form a product machine consisting of 
product states. The latter are tuples of concurrent basic sub-tier states. Moreover, in 
the AE product machine, the ASSL state-transition operations Op are considered 
product transitions that move from one product state to another. Note that the states in 
the state machine of the whole AS product machine can be obtained by the Cartesian 
product of all the AE product machines. Thus, by considering the sub-tier state ma-
chines we construct the Voyager AE product machine (see Fig. 6). Note that this is 
again a simplified model where not all the possible product states are shown.  
Fig. 6 presents the AE product states as large circles embedding the sub-tier states 
(depicted as smaller circles). Here we use the following aliases: e states for Event state 
machine; f states for Fluent state machine; a states for Action state machine;  
y states for Communication Function state machine; x states for Message state machine. 
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Fig. 6. Voyager AE product machine 
Moreover, white circles present ”idle” state and gray circles present the corresponding 
”active” state of the sub-tier state machine under consideration (such as: prompted for 
events, initiated for fluents, etc.; see  Fig. 5). 
Therefore, the formal presentation (S; Op; R; S0; AP; L) (see Section 4.1) of the 
Voyager AE ASG is: 
• S = {S1; S2; S3; S4; S5; S6; S7} 
• Op = {Event; FluentIn; EventOver; ActionMap; Function; MsgSent} 
• R = {(S1;S2;Event); (S2;S3;FluentIn); (S3;S4;EventOver); 
(S4;S5;ActionMap); (S5;S6;Function); (S6;S7;MsgSent)} 
• S0 = S1 (initial state) 
• AP = { event pictureTaken occurs, event pictureTaken terminates, action 
processPicture starts, fluent inProcessingPicturePixels initiates, func-
tion sendBeginSessionMsgs starts, sends message x } 
• L(S): 
o L(S1) = { event pictureTaken occurs };  
o L(S2) = { fluent inProcessingPicturePixels initiates };  
o L(S3) = { event pictureTaken terminates };  
o L(S4) = { action processPicture starts }; 
o L(S5) = { function sendBeginSessionMsgs starts };  
o L(S6) = { sends message x }; 
Moreover, we consider the following correctness properties applicable to our case: 
• If an event occurs eventually a fluent initiates. 
• If an event occurs next eventually it terminates. 
• If a fluent initiates next actions start. 
• If an action starts eventually a function starts. 
• If a function starts eventually it sends a message. 
The ASSL model-checking mechanism uses the correctness property formulae to 
check if these are held over product states considering the atomic propositions AP 
true for every state. Thus, the ASSL framework is able to trace the state path shown in 
Fig. 6 and to validate the liveness property stated above. Note that in this example, we 
intentionally presented a limited set of atomic propositions AP and correctness prop-
erties. The former are derivable, that is, deduced from the operational evaluation of 
the ASSL specification. Moreover, the Voyager AE product machine presents only 
product states relevant to our case study. 
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5   Automatic Test Case Generation with ASSL  
To allow post-implementation software verification with the ASSL framework, we 
are currently developing a novel test-generator tool based on change-impact analysis 
that will help the ASSL framework automatically generate test suites for self-
managing policies.  Conceptually, the test generator tool accepts as input an ASSL 
specification (see Section 2) comprising sets of policies ߎ that need to be tested and 
generates a set of test cases ߒ as tuples ߒ ሼ ௘ܲ௫, ܣ ሼܫ, ܴሽሽ comprising an execution path 
௘ܲ௫  and test attributes ܣ. The latter is a tuple comprising needed inputs ܫ and optional 
replacement ASSL constructs ܴ. The replacement ASSL constructs are automatically 
or semi-automatically specified and generated as supplementary software stubs to 
ensure the execution of ௘ܲ௫ .  
Table 2 presents a privateMessageInsecure replacement event that is intended to  
replace the original privateMessageInsecure event. As shown, the replacement event 
guarantees that this event will occur in the system because: 1) it does not have a 
GUARDS clause that prevents the event from firing if special conditions are not met; 
and 2) its activation (see the ACTIVATION clause in Table 2) is time-ensured; i.e., it 
does not depend on external factors. 
Table 2. Original and replacement ASSL events 
Original Event Replacement Event 
EVENT privateMessageInsecure { 
 GUARDS {  NOT ME-
TRICS.thereIsInsecureMsg }  
 ACTIVATION {  
 CHANGED { METRICS.thereIsInsecureMsg } 
} 
} 
EVENT privateMessageInsecure {  
 ACTIVATION {   
 PERIOD { 1 min }  
} 
} 
5.1   Test Generation Methodology 
5.1.1   Policy Execution Paths 
Formally, from a policy execution perspective, an ASSL-specified self-management 
policy ߨ may be presented as a tuple: 
 
ߨ ሼܨ, ܣሽ 
 
where F presents the fluents driving the policy in question and A presents the actions 
that eventually will be undertaken while the policy is active. Here, for each fluent 
f א F we have: 
 
݂ ሼܧܽ, ܣ݂, ܧݐሽ 
 
where ܧܽ and ܧݐ are the sets of fluent-activating and fluent-terminating events re-
spectively and ܣ݂ ؿ ܣ  is the set of actions to be executed by ݂. Further, an event: 
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݁ א ܧܽ ڂ ܧݐ is a tuple ݁ ሼ݃ݎ݀, ܽܿݐሽ 
 
where grd is the GUARDS clause and act is the ACTIVATION clause of the event ݁. 
Finally, an action ܽ א ܣ is a tuple: 
 
ܽ ሼ݃ݎ݀, ݁݊ݏ, ܧݐݎ, ܧ݁ݎሽ 
 
where ݃ݎ݀ and ݁݊ݏ are the action’s GUARDS and ENSURES clauses (state post-
conditions that must be met after the action execution [1, 2]) respectively, and Etr and 
Eer are sets of events triggered by the action ܽ in case of normal and erroneous action 
execution. 
The execution of a policy π is activation and termination of the policy’s fluents. 
Thus, to trace the policy execution, we must consider the execution paths of all the 
policy’s fluents ܨ. The execution path of a fluent is a sequence of the form: 
 
ሼܧܽ, ܣ݂, ܧݐሽ 
 
The number of execution paths of a fluent with ݊ activation events ܧܽ, ݉ termination 
events ܧݐ, and ݇ actions ܣ is a product: 
 
݉ ൈ  ݊ ൈ ݒሺ݇ሻ 
 
where the function ݒሺ݇ሻ gives the variations in the execution of ܣ. This function takes 
into account the action’s formal attributes: ݃ݎ݀, ݁݊ݏ, ܧݐݎ, and ܧ݁ݎ, together with 
their internal dependencies and ASSL formal semantics [1, 2] as following: 
• ܧݐݎ and ܧ݁ݎ are mutually exclusive, i.e., both cannot co-exist in same execu-
tion path; 
• if ݁݊ݏ is not met (denoted as !݁݊ݏ ), then ܧ݁ݎ is mandatory; 
• if ݃ݎ݀ is not met (denoted as !݃ݎ݀), then the action ܽ is not executed (de-
noted as !ܽ). 
Note that to simplify the problem, in this formal model we consider events as acti-
vated or not activated, thus helping us generalize over the event’s clauses GUARDS 
and ACTIVATION. To illustrate the formal model, we present a simple example of a 
fluent 
 
݂ ሼܧܽ, ܣ݂, ܧݐሽ 
 
where n ൌ 1, m ൌ 1, k ൌ 2, and: 
 
ܧܽ ൌ ሼ݁ܽ1ሽ 
ܧݐ ൌ ሼ݁ݐ1ሽ 
ܣ݂ ൌ ሼܽ1; ܽ2ሽ 
ܽ1 ൌ ሼ݃ݎ݀1; ݁݊ݏ1; ܧݐݎ1; ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ 
ܽ2 ൌ ሼ݃ݎ݀2; ݁݊ݏ2; ܧݐݎ2; ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ 
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Here, the possible execution paths of the fluent f are: 
 
ܲ݁ݔ1 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧݐݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧݐݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ2 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧݐݎ1ሽ, ! ܽ2ሼ! ݃ݎ݀2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ3 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧݐݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ! ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ4 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧݐݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ5 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ! ܽ1ሼ! ݃ݎ݀1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧݐݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ6 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ! ܽ1ሼ! ݃ݎ݀1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ! ݃ݎ݀2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ7 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ! ܽ1ሼ! ݃ݎ݀1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ! ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ8 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ! ܽ1ሼ! ݃ݎ݀1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ9 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ! ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧݐݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ10 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ! ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ! ܽ2ሼ! ݃ݎ݀2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ11 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ! ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ! ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ12 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ! ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ13 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧݐݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ14 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ! ܽ2ሼ! ݃ݎ݀2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ15 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ! ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
ܲ݁ݔ16 ൌ  ሼ݁ܽ1, ܽ1ሼ݃ݎ݀1, ݁݊ݏ1, ܧ݁ݎ1ሽ, ܽ2ሼ݃ݎ݀2, ݁݊ݏ2, ܧ݁ݎ2ሽ, ݁ݐ1ሽ; 
5.1.2   ASSL Test Generator 
With the ASSL Test Generator we are aiming at a novel tool based on change-impact 
analysis that helps the ASSL framework automatically generate high-quality test 
suites for self-management policies. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Operational view of the ASSL Test Generator 
As shown in Fig. 7, the test generator tool consists of four major components: poli-
cy extractor, change-impact analyzer, test suit generator, and test suit reducer. The 
key notion of the tool is to synthesize two or more execution paths of the same policy 
in such a way that test coverage targets (e.g., certain policies, rules, or conditions) are 
covered by the synthesized execution paths. The change-impact analysis component 
can then determine for each execution path the needed test attributes ܰ such as inputs 
ܫ and optional replacement constructs ܴ in the form of ASSL events, ASSL actions, 
and ACTIVATION, GUARDS, and ENSURES clauses, needed to be employed by an ex-
ecution path in order to ensure the same.  
Based on the determined test attributes and execution paths, the tool generates tests 
ܶ. Often the number of generated tests is large (recall that the number of fluent execu-
tion paths is a product of the number of events and actions employed by a fluent) and 
it is not feasible for developers to manually inspect their responses. To mitigate this 
issue, the final step of the test generator tool reduces the number of generated tests by 
selecting tests based on policy structural coverage. 
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5.1.3   Change-Impact Analysis 
The goal of change-impact analysis is to determine what should be changed in the 
events and actions employed by a particular fluent execution path ܲ݁ݔ in order to 
ensure the same. In general, ASSL facilitates change-impact analysis because ASSL 
specifications allow: 
1) extraction of information from the model to see where a change must occur 
in order to force one or more execution paths; 
2) calculation of the change impact on the other parts of the model for any  
proposed change. 
Here, of major importance the evaluation of how the execution of a fluent will be 
affected by a change in a particular event (GUARDS or ACTIVATION clause) or action 
(GUARDS or ENSURES clause). Note that at the time of writing, we are working on the 
change-impact analysis heuristic algorithm. Our initial results have demonstrated that 
this algorithm should involve the following logical steps. 
A. Evaluate what the conditions that must be met to have a specific fluent  
execution path ensured are: 
a. Evaluate the events employed by a specific fluent: 
1) For each event analyze the pre-conditions that must be met (GUARDS 
clause) and the activation conditions (ACTIVATION clause); 
2) Evaluate if a particular event drives (activates or terminates) mul-
tiple fluents. 
b.  Evaluate the actions employed by a specific fluent: 
1) For each action analyze the pre- and post-conditions that must be 
met (GUARDS and ENSURES clause) and the events that are triggered 
by the action (TRIGGERS and ONERR_TRIGGERS clauses); 
2) Evaluate if the action itself executes other ASSL actions, or other 
executable constructs that may have impact on events such as ASSL 
interaction functions and ASSL managed element functions (both 
are sub-tiers in the ASSL specification model [1, 2]). 
c. Generate a test case that meets the fluent execution path’s conditions. 
Replacement constructs must be generated when the original ones can-
not ensure the path execution. For example, if an event cannot be trig-
gered due to conditions that must be met new replacement event may be 
generated that simulates the old one. 
B. Evaluate what the impact of having two or more fluent executing simulta-
neously is and what the conditions that must be met for that are. Generate 
test cases. 
C. Evaluate the policies involved in the tested execution path for the presence of 
chained fluents (the termination of a fluent activates another one, and so on). 
Find the conditions that must be met for that. Generate test cases. 
In addition, it is important to evaluate the impact of modifying an existing construct 
and that of replacing the same construct with a completely new one. Another aspect 
that must be addressed by the change-impact analysis is the tradeoffs stemming from 
disabling GUARDS and ENSURES clauses. Note that such clauses act as special beha-
vior constraints and are usually specified to ensure that certain conditions are met 
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before processing (or terminating) actions or events. Therefore, by disabling (remov-
ing) those constraints (see Table 2), we may ensure certain execution paths, but the 
impact of such a change needs to be also analyzed in the context of tradeoffs coming 
with the unconstrained behavior. 
6   Conclusion and Future Work 
We have presented software verification mechanisms for ASs (autonomic systems) 
developed with the ASSL framework.  The family of software-verification framework 
tools includes: consistency checker, model checker, and test case generator. Current-
ly, the ASSL consistency checker is the only fully implemented tool. It automatically 
checks ASSL specifications for consistency errors and some design flaws.  The latter 
are verified against special consistency rules implemented as semantic definitions.  
We have also presented our experiences to-date in developing the model checker 
and test case generator tools for ASSL. To implement the model checker, we devel-
oped program structures and algorithms that help an ASSL specification be trans-
formed into a state-transition graph composed of special tier states with associated 
atomic propositions and transition relations connecting those states. We are currently 
developing a model-checking engine that works on the state transition graph. In addi-
tion, possible solutions to the so-called state-explosion problem are considered.  
The test case generator tool aims at automatic generation of test suites for self-
management policies. A test case is generated with a policy-execution path and test 
attributes that come in the form of inputs and special replacement ASSL constructs 
ensuring the execution of a tested policy. The test attributes are determined by 
change-impact analysis of the effect of a change in particular events or particular 
actions employed by an execution path. It is our understanding that such a testing 
mechanism is going to have a great impact on the development of prototype models 
for current and future space-exploration missions. Properly tested prototypes, even-
tually, will lead to the construction of more reliable spacecraft systems. Note that 
traditional methods, such as analyzing each requirement and developing test cases to 
verify the correctness of ASSL-implemented ASs, are not effective, because they 
require complete understanding of the overall complex system’s self-management 
behavior. 
Our plans for future work are mainly concerned with further development of the 
model checker and test-case generator tools for ASSL. Further, we plan to generate 
test cases for a number of self-managing policies developed for ANTS to determine 
the effectiveness of this approach as a test-covering and test-generation strategy. 
Moreover, it is our intention to build an animation tool for ASSL that will help to 
visualize counterexamples and trace erroneous execution paths. 
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